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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. 34A-l-303(2)(b); 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2-801(7); and 34A-2-801(8)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the medical records exhibit was sufficiently exhaustive
and properly relied upon by the Administrative Law Judge and Labor Commission
when denying Benson's request for permanent total disability benefits.1
Standard of Review:
This issue involves the challenge of an agency's interpretation and
application of statute, specifically Utah Administrative Rule 602-2-1(H) which
governs the form and creation of the medical records exhibit. As such, the
applicable standard of review is reasonableness and rationality, also known as
abuse of discretion. Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 855 P.2d 267,
269-70 (Utah App 1993). See also, Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d
1294, 1296 (Utah 1992); Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. Tax
Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah App. 1993).
Issue 2: Whether the Administrative Law Judge and Labor Commission
abused their discretion by denying Benson's permanent total disability claim
without submitting the question of causation to a medical panel.

2

This issue encompasses issues 1, 2, 4, and 6 raised in Benson's brief.
This issue encompasses issues 3 and 5 raised in Benson's brief.
1

Standard of Review:
This issue involves the challenge of an agency's interpretation and
application of statute, specifically Utah Administrative Rule 602-2-2 which
governs the utilization of medical panels. As such, the applicable standard of
review is that of reasonableness and rationality, as explained above.
This issue also involves a challenge to the agency's determination that there
was not a significant difference of medical opinion concerning the cause of
Benson's left knee injury. This is a question of fact and the agency's factual
determination should be upheld so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.
Brown & Root Indus. Service v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 677
(Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The determinative statutes and rules may be found in their entirety in
Addendum A. Their citations are Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l); Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-601; Utah Administrative Code R602-2-l(H); Utah Administrative
Code R602-2-2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellee, Lucent Technologies ("Lucent")3, respectfully requests that
this Court uphold the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and
Labor Commission ("the Commission") below to deny the Appellant, Ron
Benson's request for permanent total compensation benefits.
The Appellant in this case, Ron Benson ("Benson"), is a college educated
former employee of Lucent Technologies. (R. Vol. 4 at 38.) He has held a wide
variety of jobs with Lucent, including managerial and "desk job" positions. (R.
Vol. 4. at 35-38.) This case arises due to an industrial accident in which Benson
was injured while in the employ of Lucent. (R. Vol. 4 at 9.) On October 3 rd 1997,
Benson visited a job site as part of his duties as a field services manager. (R. Vol.
4 at 9.) While at the site, another individual accidentally pulled a large stack of
industrial grade sheetrock over onto Benson, which struck his feet and legs. (R.
Vol. 4 at 11; Vol. 2 at 3.)
Benson was taken to the emergency room at Alta View Hospital. (R. Vol.
4 at 13.) At the emergency room he reported that he had twisted his right foot,
landed on his right knee and foot, and that a piece of sheetrock had landed on his
left foot. (R. Vol. 2 at 11.) He said he had pain and swelling in the right foot,
with minimal pain in the left, and denied any ankle pain, knee pain, or other
injuries. (R. Vol. 2 at 11.) X-rays showed a fracture in the right foot, but no
3

Benson inadvertently failed to include Lucent as a defendant in the case caption.
However, Lucent is made a party by operation of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2801(8)(b)(i).
3

injuries to the left. (R. Vol. 2 at 12.) Benson was placed in a right foot splint,
given crutches and a prescription for Lortab, told to ice and elevate his foot, and
finally discharged. (R. Vol. 2 at 12.) Shortly thereafter, Benson began treating
with Dr. Gordon and eventually underwent surgery on his right foot on November
5, 1997. (R. Vol. 2 at 137.) Benson's recovery from surgery went well and he
was released to work on January 26, 1998. (R. Vol. 2 at 140; Vol. 4 at 16.) He
was compensated for his medical treatment and temporary total disability for the
entirety of his time off work. (R. Vol. 4 at 16; R. Vol. 1 at 68.)
Due to his injury, Benson's doctor restricted him to jobs involving seated
positions. (R. Vol. 4 at 16.) Lucent accommodated Benson's restrictions and
brought him back as a serialization manager, a position that allowed him to stay
off his feet. (R. Vol. 4 at 36.) After working for nearly a year as a serialization
manager, and contrary to his doctor's restrictions, Benson accepted a position as
an assistant consultant. (R. Vol. 4 at 17.) The new position required much more
time on his feet and aggravated Benson's injury. (R. Vol. 4 at 17.) After about
five months, and at the request of Benson's doctor, Benson was made a resource
scheduler, a position that was largely a desk job. (R. Vol. 4 at 19.)
Nearly three years after Benson had returned to work from his injury, and
after working as a resource scheduler for over a year, Lucent offered numerous
people and job positions an early retirement package. (R. Vol. 4 at 20.) Benson
accepted early retirement and his last day of work was September 29, 2000. (R.
Vol. 4 at 20.)
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Course of Proceedings
On June 2nd, 2004, Benson filed an application for hearing with the Utah
Labor Commission requesting compensation for permanent total disability arising
from his October 3rd, 1997 accident. (R. Vol. 1 at 2.) During the discovery
period leading up to the hearing, Benson attended an independent medical
examination and functional capacity evaluation at Lucent's request. At Benson's
evidentiary hearing on April 24, 2005, Benson's counsel unexpectedly made an
impromptu motion to have Lucent's medical and functional capacity expert reports
excluded because they were submitted to Benson's attorney later than 45 days
prior to the hearing as technically required by the Labor Commission rules. (R.
Vol. 4 at 3.) The ALJ granted the motion and the reports were excluded. (R. Vol.
4 at 7.)
On April 28, 2005, the ALJ released her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order concerning Benson's claims of permanent total impairment. (R.
Vol. 1 at 67.) She found that Benson had failed to prove that he was unable to
perform his former work as a scheduler for Lucent, that he had failed to prove that
he was unable to perform other work that was reasonably available, and that he
had failed to prove that his industrial injury was the direct cause of his permanent
total disability. (R. Vol. 1 at 70-71.) Because Benson had failed to prove essential
elements of his claims, the ALJ did not address any remaining issues. (R. Vol. 1
at 71.)
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On May 25, 2005, Benson appealed the ALJ's decision to the Labor
Commissioner. (R. Vol. 1 at 74.) In his appeal, Benson argued that the
Commissioner should review four attached documents that he had not included in
the medical record exhibit (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "MRE"). (R.
Vol. 1 at 74.) Lucent's memorandum in opposition to review argued that Lucent
had never received the additional records and that Benson should have produced
them before the MRE was compiled. (R. Vol. 1 at 81-82.) Lucent also noted that
two of its own medical reports had been excluded from the MRE based on
timeliness objections, and argued that it would be patently unfair to allow Benson
to add previously undisclosed documents to the MRE after the hearing when
Lucent had not been allowed to add records to the MRE that had been disclosed
prior to the hearing. (R. Vol 1 at 81-82.)
On January 10, 2006, the Commissioner issued an order denying Benson's
motion for review. (R. Vol. 1 at 85.) The Commissioner refused to consider
Benson's additional documents because they were not submitted in the timeframe
required by statute. (R. Vol. 1 at 85.) In a footnote, the Commissioner added that
even if the Commission were to consider the additional evidence proffered by
Benson, it would not have changed the decision because the more persuasive
evidence was already in the record. (R. Vol. 1 at 86.) The Commissioner adopted
the ALJ's finding of fact and held that Benson was not permanently and totally
disabled, and that even if he was, his industrial accident was not the cause. (R.
Vol. 1 at 86.)

On March 10, 2006, Benson filed a request for reconsideration with the
Commissioner. Benson's request included approximately 71 pages of additional
documents that Benson asked the Commission to review. (R. Vol. 1 at 96.)
Lucent argued that Benson's documents were irrelevant because they did not
address the facts that the ALJ had relied upon to arrive at her ruling on the Motion
for Review, and that most of the additional documents were not appropriate for
inclusion into the MRE in any case. (R. Vol. 1 at 186-188.) Lucent also argued
that any omissions in the MRE were created by Benson's failure to include the
records in a timely fashion, and that as such they should be excluded for failure to
comply with statutory guidelines. (R. Vol. 1 at 186-188.)
The Labor Commission denied Benson's request for reconsideration on
March 31, 2006. This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should find that ALJ and Labor Commission did not abuse their
discretion by relying on the MRE as it existed at the time of the evidentiary
hearing or by not submitting the question of causation concerning Benson's left
knee injury to a medical panel.
Benson argues that there were significant omissions and errors in the MRE
that lead the ALJ and Commission to err in their determination that he was not
entitled to benefits for permanent total disability. However, the ALJ and
Commission were correct in relying on the MRE because any omissions in the
record were caused by Benson's failure to include records that were in his
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possession. Furthermore, the additional documents that Benson wanted to add to
the MRE did not address the primary facts that the ALJ and Commission relied
upon to deny Benson's claim, thus their omission was irrelevant. Finally,
Benson's contention that the MRE was flawed as a whole due to organizational
errors fails because the mere misfiling of records in the MRE, without a showing
that the misfilings
prejudiced Benson, is not sufficient to invalidate the MRE.
Benson also argues that the ALJ and the Labor Commission should have
submitted the question of causation concerning his left knee injury to a medical
panel because there were conflicting medical opinions regarding causation.
However, the ALJ and the Commission were correct in not convening a medical
panel because the cause of Benson's left knee injury was irrelevant due to the fact
that he had failed to prove that he was totally disabled. Additionally, the ALJ did
not abuse her discretion by failing to analyze all of the issues surrounding
Benson's claim for benefits once she determined that his claim for permanent total
disability benefits had failed. Finally, there were no significant conflicts of
medical opinion concerning the cause of Benson's left knee injury, and even if
there had been, such conflicts were irrelevant to the issue of permanent and total
disability.

8

ARGUMENT
This Court should find that the Labor Commission did not abuse its
discretion by relying on the medical records exhibit as it existed at the time of the
evidentiary hearing, and that it did not abuse its discretion by not convening a
medical panel to determine the cause of Benson's left knee injury. Before
addressing the main points raised in Benson's argument, Lucent would like to
address two issues related to difficulties that have arisen in interpreting and
answering Benson's brief.
First, where a briefs overall analysis is so lacking that it shifts the burden
of research and argument to the Court, the Court need not even consider it.
Morgan v. Labor Com'n, 2003 Utah App 293. While Lucent appreciates the
difficulties faced by a pro se appellant, Benson's brief is devoid of almost any
relevant legal analysis. His arguments are largely bald assertions that lack a
foundation in law or fact, and his brief is structured in such a way that it requires
the reader to guess at the topics he addresses and the arguments he makes. Lucent
has spent considerable time and effort extracting and organizing the seemingly
random collection of arguments contained in Benson's brief. It is not the Court's
responsibility to guess at the arguments and structure of a brief, and as such, it
would seem entirely appropriate for this Court to not even consider the merits of
Benson's arguments and deny his appeal as inadequately briefed. Id,
Second, the issues addressed by Lucent in this brief represent a good faith
effort to distill and organize the arguments raised by Benson in his appeal. It is
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Lucent's understanding that Benson has not directly challenged any of the
Commission's findings of fact other than its finding that there were not significant
conflicting opinions concerning the cause of Benson's left knee injury. Benson's
arguments focus largely on alleged deficiencies in the medical records exhibit and
the Commission's failure to completely review the MRE. To the extent that this
Court finds that Benson has challenged findings of fact, it must uphold the
Commission's findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993). Lucent
contends that the record as a whole contains substantial evidence sufficient to
support all of the Commission's factual findings.
Additionally, Benson failed to marshal evidence as required to challenge a
finding of fact. A party challenging a lower court's findings of fact has the burden
of establishing that those findings are not supported by the evidence. Cambelt Int'
Corp. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). To successfully challenge a
trial court's findings of fact on appeal, an appellant must list all the evidence
supporting the findings and then show that the evidence is inadequate to sustain
the findings, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the court below.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). "If the appellant fails to
marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports the
findings of the trial court." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). In
this case, Benson has not even attempted to marshal the evidence. Therefore, to
the extent that Benson challenges the Labor Commission's factual findings, such
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challenge must be rejected, and this Court should hold that the record supports the
findings of the Labor Commission below.
POINT 1
THE LABOR COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY RELYING ON THE MEDICAL RECORDS EXHIBIT AS IT
EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING.
A. The Labor Commission Was Correct in Refusing to Review
Additional Documents Proffered by Benson After the Evidentiary
Hearing Because Any Omissions in the Medical Records Exhibit
Were the Result of Benson's Own Failure to Include Documents
That Were in His Possession.
The Commission's reliance on the medical records exhibit was not an abuse
of discretion because any omissions in the record were caused by Benson's own
failure to include documents he had in his possession long before the evidentiary
hearing. The creation of the MRE is governed by Utah Administrative Code Rule
R602-2-l(H), which states:
1. The parties are expected to exchange medical records during
the discovery period
2. Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records contained
in his/her possession to the respondent for the preparation of a
joint medical records exhibit at least twenty (20) working
days prior to the scheduled hearing.
3. The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record exhibit
containing all relevant medical records. The medical record
exhibit shall include all relevant treatment records that tend to
prove or disprove a fact in issue. Hospital nurses' notes,
duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials need not
be included in the medical records exhibit.
4. The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged by
medical care provider in chronological order and bound.
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5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent shall
be delivered to the Division and the petitioner or petitioner's
counsel at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing. Late-filed
medical records may or may not be admitted at the discretion
of the administrative law judge by stipulation or for good
cause shown.
Under this statutory scheme, the petitioner in a workers' compensation case
has the responsibility to provide the respondent with all of the medical records that
the petitioner wants included in the record. The respondent then compiles the
MRE and delivers it to the petitioner at least ten days prior to the hearing; ample
time for the petitioner to review the record for accuracy and completeness. If any
records have been omitted, the petitioner may request that they be added to the
record. This is generally accomplished between the parties previous to the hearing,
although it is not unusual for an ALJ to allow previously disclosed records into the
MRE at the hearing. Additional records may be admitted at the discretion of the
ALJ if good cause is shown.
In this matter, Benson has not shown good cause to allow additional
records to be admitted. He provided a number of records to Lucent previous to the
evidentiary hearing, all of which were incorporated into the MRE. The MRE was
delivered for inspection to Benson's attorney before the hearing. Benson did not
request that additional records be added to the MRE either before or during the
hearing. Instead, Benson signaled that he expected strict adherence to the
Administrative Rules by moving to have both of Lucent's expert reports excluded
because Lucent had not served its pretrial disclosures a full 45 days previous to the
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hearing as technically required by Rule 602-2-1(I)(3). Benson's motion was
successful and Lucent's expert reports were excluded from the MRE.
In his motion for review, Benson attempted to submit four pages of
additional documents for review, but did not explain why the additional
documents had not been included in the MRE prior to the hearing. (R. Vol. 1 at
74.) In Benson's request for reconsideration, in which he attempted to submit
even more new documents, he stated several times that his former attorney had not
given him the opportunity to review the MRE before his hearing. (R. Vol. 1 at
105.) He seems to imply that his attorney was at fault for not including the
additional documents. (R. Vol. 1 at 105, 109.) Finally, in his appellate brief,
Benson claims that he gave the additional documents to his attorney well in
advance of the creation of the MRE and suggests that his attorney did not forward
them to Lucent for inclusion in the MRE. (Appellant's Brief at 5.) Benson also
suggests that Allen may have given the additional documents, which were
apparently derived from Benson's request for Social Security benefits, to Lucent's
attorney, but that Lucent instead included documents that it had obtained directly
from the Social Security Administration.4 (Appellant's Brief at 5.)
No matter what explanation is forwarded by Benson, the only relevant fact
is that Benson apparently failed to review the MRE prior to the evidentiary
4

Lucent does not have a clear understanding why Benson believes that the
documents he obtained from his doctor and submitted to the Social Security
Administration are different from those that Lucent obtained directly from the
Social Security Administration. Lucent is not aware of any facts that would
suggest the documents were different.
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hearing. If Benson feels that this is the fault of his attorney, he should raise that
issue with him. Clearly, Lucent fulfilled its statutory duty to compile the MRE
and then submitted it to Benson for his inspection. Lucent cannot be expected to
include documents that it had not received, nor does Lucent or the Commission
have a duty to ensure that Benson reviewed the MRE before the hearing. The
Commissioner noted that the additional documents Benson proffered were
prepared well in advance of the evidentiary hearing and that he had failed to
explain why he did not include them in the MRE. (R. Vol. 1 at 86.) As such, the
Commission declined to consider them because they had not been submitted in
accordance to the statutory requirements. (R. Vol. 1 at 85, 86.) Finally, it would
be patently unfair to allow Benson to include additional documents in the MRE
after he had successfully petitioned the ALJ to exclude Lucent's expert reports for
violating similar technical timing requirements. (R. Vol. 4 at 7.) For these
reasons, Lucent asks this Court to find that the Commission did not abuse its
discretion by not reviewing additional documentation proffered by Benson after
the evidentiary hearing.
B. The Medical RecoicK luliilnl Pit! ,Nn( iiiiliidv A nv Significant
Omissions.
As stated previously, the Labor Commission acted properly in refusing
Benson's request to supplement the MRE. However, even if this decision were
improper, it would be immaterial to the denial of Benson's permanent total
disability claim because the MRE did not include any significant omissions.
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Benson criticizes the MRE for being incomplete and it appears that the focus
of his argument is the 58 pages of documents he attached to his Request for
Reconsideration to the Commissioner. (R. Vol. 1 at 96.) Many of the
documents in question are not appropriate for the MRE? given that they are
correspondence, bills, and other documents that are not "medical records."
Furthermore, the additional documents do not change the basic facts that
are already set forth in the MRE. The "omitted" documents largely reiterate
the undisputed fact that Benson suffered a serious workplace injury. Some of
the documents reflect Dr. Watson's opinion that Benson's depression and
anxiety symptoms were caused by the industrial accident. However, these
same points were already made in the records that were included in the medical
records exhibit (R. Vol. 3 at 392, 394.) Additionally, Dr. Watson's opinion
that Benson's alleged depression, anxiety, chronic pain, and sleep problems are
related to his industrial accident is already presented, although admittedly
misfiled, in the MRE. (R. Vol. 3 at 469.) Thus, in this regard, the records
Benson seeks to add are merely redundant, as noted by the Commissioner in
his denial of the request for reconsideration.
Moreover, the additional records do not address the reasons that the ALJ
and Commission cited when denying Benson's request for benefits. The ALJ held
that Benson had not proved that he was unable to perform his former work as a
scheduler, that he had not proved that he was unable to perform other work
reasonably available, and that he had not proved that his industrial accident was
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the direct cause of his permanent total disability. These holdings were based
largely on the fact that he was able to perform his job duties for several years
before leaving Lucent, that he only left Lucent once he was offered early
retirement, and that he has the education and experience to perform sedentary
office work. (R. Vol. 1 at 70-71.) The Commission agreed with the ALJ and
added that "[e]ven if the Commission were to consider the evidence proffered by
Mr. Benson, such evidence would not change the Commission's decision. The
more persuasive evidence already in the record convinces the Commission that Mr.
Benson is not permanently and totally disabled within the meaning of the Act." (R.
Vol. 1 at 86.)
None of Benson's additional documents dispute or negate the facts that the
ALJ and the Commission relied upon in denying Benson's request for permanent
total disability. Thus, their omission from the MRE was irrelevant and
insignificant. Because the omissions in the MRE are not critical, this Court should
find that the ALJ and the Commission did not abuse their discretion by relying on
the MRE as it existed at the time of the evidentiary hearing to deny Benson's
request for permanent total impairment compensation.
C. The Commission Did Not Abuse its Discretion By Relying on the
Medical Record Exhibit Despite its Organizational Problems.
The Commission's reliance on the MRE was not an abuse of discretion
despite the record's organizational problems. Benson has exhaustively
documented every misfiling in the MRE, most of which relate to a group of
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documents that were inadvertently filed under tab eight, which was intended for
records from the University of Utah Pain Management Center. However, he has
not demonstrated that these errors affected how the Labor Commission decided his
case.
Benson had ample opportunity to review the MRE prior to his evidentiary
hearing. If he had concerns about the state of the MRE's organization, he should
have voiced them prior to the hearing. Instead, his silence on the subject acted as
an implicit ratification of the MRE, misfilings and all.
Benson has not cited any law suggesting that the misfilings in an MRE in
and of themselves invalidate the entire record. If that were the case, many MREs
would likely be deemed invalid. More importantly, he has not cited any evidence
indicating that the ALJ or the Commission had any difficulty navigating the MRE.
The unintentional misfiling of documents in the MRE is similar to an "Exhibit A"
attached to a motion being accidentally identified as "Exhibit B" in the argument
portion of the motion, or similar minor lapses and missteps that occur all the time
in litigation documents notwithstanding exhaustive proofreading. Without
evidence that he was somehow prejudiced by the misfilings, or that the
Commission missed important evidence due to the misfilings, they cannot be
viewed as anything more serious than unfortunate but inconsequential mistakes
that did not affect the outcome of the case.
The mere fact that organizational errors exist in the MRE is not sufficient to
invalidate the exhibit, and without evidence of a negative effect on Benson's claim,
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there is no reason to assume that the Commission abused its discretion by relying
on the MRE despite its imperfections. This Court should find that the Commission
and ALJ did not abuse their discretion by relying on the MRE notwithstanding its
misfilings because Benson had the opportunity to review the MRE before it was
submitted at the evidentiary hearing, there is no evidence that Benson was
prejudiced due to the misfilings, and there is no evidence that the misfilings
effected the Commission's ability to find the important records upon which its
decisions were based.
D. The Record Shows That the Administrative Law Judge and Labor
Commission Reviewed and Understood the Medical Record.
Throughout his brief, Benson alleges that the ALJ and the Commission did
not review the entire MRE, misunderstood the MRE, or purposefully ignored
portions of the MRE so that they could rule against his claim. These unfounded
allegations are not supported by the record.
Benson has not cited a single piece of evidence that suggesting that the ALJ
or the Commission failed to properly review the evidence. Instead, his brief cites,
ad nauseum, to pages of evidence that were submitted to the ALJ in the MRE. His
circular reasoning appears to be that if the ALJ and the Commission had seen this
evidence they could not have possibly denied his request for benefits, so because
they denied his request for benefits they must not have reviewed the cited
evidence. However, in their denial of Benson's request for review, the
Commissioner stated that he denied Benson's claims because "the more persuasive
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evidence already in the record convinces the Commission that Mr. Benson is not
permanently and totally disabled." (R. Vol. 1 at 86.) Despite Benson's incredulity
that the Commission could arrive at such a conclusion in the face of what he views
as irrefutable evidence, it is clear that the issue is not that the Commission did not
review Benson's evidence, but rather that it found other evidence to be more
persuasive.
The decisions released by the ALJ and the Commission in this case make
it clear that Benson's evidence was carefully reviewed. In her decision, the ALJ
addressed all of the ailments that Benson claims to have made him permanently
and totally disabled, including his right foot and leg, left knee, insomnia,
depression, stress, anxiety, and restless leg syndrome. (R. Vol. 1 at 68.) She also
addressed other considerations, such as Dr. Barbuto's determination that Benson
had "obvious pain behaviors of a psychosocial type" accompanied by "frequent
wincing and melodrama in his movements." (R. Vol. 1 at 69.) Further, the ALJ
noted that Benson had worked for nearly three years after the accident and
continued to be qualified and able to hold an office job involving sedentary work
responsibilities. (R. Vol. 1 at 70-71.)
There is no question that one of the primary duties of the ALJ is to weigh
the evidence and assess its credibility. Martin v. La-Z-Bov, Inc., 2004 UT App 31.
The fact that the ALJ arrived at a decision that Benson does not agree with does
not indicate that his evidence was not reviewed. Rather, it merely indicates that
the evidence was weighed and that the judge found the evidence opposing

19

Benson's claim to be more credible than that supporting his claim. Based on
Benson's total lack of evidence supporting his argument that the ALJ and
Commission failed to review the MRE in its entirety, and the comprehensive
review of the evidence found in the ALJ's and Commission's findings of fact,
Lucent requests that this Court rule that the Commission did not abuse its
discretion in reviewing the MRE, and interpreting the evidence therein.
POINT 2
THE ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND LABOR
COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION BY NOT
SUBMITING THE CASE TO A MEDICAL PANEL.
A. The Labor Commission Did Not Need to Submit the Case to a
Medical Panel Because Benson Failed to Prove That He was
Permanently and Totally Disabled.
The entirety of the argument portion of Benson's brief deals with his
contentions that the ALJ and Labor Commission erred in their determination that
Benson's permanent total disability was not caused by his industrial accident. He
believes this error was either caused by missing/overlooked documents in the
MRE or the ALJ's failure to submit the case to a medical panel to determine
causation. However, Benson's zeal in arguing causation is misplaced because he
failed to first prove that he has been permanently and totally disabled.
To be successful in a claim for permanent total impairment, the petitioner
must prove three things. First, he must show that he "sustained a significant
impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident or
occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement."
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Second, he must show that "he is permanently totally disabled." Finally, the
petitioner must show that "the industrial accident or occupational disease was the
direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability." Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-413(])(b).
The ALJ's findings of fact, which were later adopted by the Labor
Commission, specifically stated that Benson had failed to prove that his injuries
prevented him from performing his former job at Lucent or other readily available
work for which he was qualified. (R. Vol. 1 at 70-71). In other words, Benson
failed to satisfy his burden of proof that he was permanently and totally disabled.
Without a finding of total impairment, there is no need to consider the issue of
causation. In fact, it is impossible to establish that total impairment was caused by
a particular accident when total impairment has not been proven. Because it is
impossible to establish the causation of an injury that has not been proven, the
ALJ and Commission did not abuse their discretion by failing to submit the
question of causation to a medical panel.
B. The Administrative Law Judge Did Not Violate Benson's Rights by
Failing to Review Additional Aspects of Benson's Case After She
Had Determined That Benson Had Failed to Establish Essential
Elements of His Claim.
Benson asserts that the ALJ violated his rights by stating in her ruling that
"[b]ecause the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving these aspects of
his case, the remaining issues related to the claim need not be addressed."
Appellants Brief at 9. Tellingly, Benson does not provide any reasons or support
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as to why he believes this is the case. In actuality, the ALJ did not need to
continue her analysis once she determined that Benson's claim had not been
proven.
In her findings of fact, the ALJ found that Benson had failed to prove that
he was permanently and totally disabled and that he had failed to prove that his
industrial accident had caused his permanent disability. (R. Vol. 1 at 70-71.)
Such showings are required in order to prevail in a claim for permanent total
disability. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b). Without such showings, Benson's
claim could not be succeed. At the point that Benson's claim failed, further
analysis of other issues related to the claim was superfluous. Therefore, once the
ALJ had determined that Benson was not entitled to permanent total disability, she
did not violate Benson's rights by refusing to examine any additional issues that
may have been related to his claim.
C. There Were No Significant Conflicting Opinions Concerning the
Causation of Benson's Disabilities.
Benson argues that the ALJ and Commission abused their discretion by not
submitting the question of causation to a medical panel. Specifically, Benson
argues that the question of whether his left knee injury was caused by his
industrial accident should have been submitted to a panel. 5 As noted supra, the
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Benson's issue number three asks generally whether the judge erred by "not
convening a medical panel when there is a conflict in medical opinions."
However, it appears that this issue is specifically related to the causation of his left
knee injury. On page 8 of his brief, Benson cites Utah Administrative Code Rule
602-2-2(A)(l), which deals specifically with the question of causation. On the
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issue of causation is irrelevant unless total impairment has been established.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Benson had established total impairment,
the ALJ still did not abuse its discretion by ruling on the question of causation
without the assistance of a medical panel.
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601 gives the Labor Commission discretion
whether to appoint a medical panel. However, the Commission has also adopted
Administrative Rule R602-2-2, which states that a medical panel must be utilized
if there are significant medical issues demonstrated by conflicting medical
opinions concerning important topics such as those "related to causation of the
injury." The Utah Supreme Court has summarized this rule (then numbered as
R568-1-9) and explained the standard of review concerning its application as
follows:
This rule requires the ALJ to submit the case to a medical panel
when "[one or more significant medical issues may be involved." A
significant medical issue must generally be shown by conflicting
medical reports. Thus, referral to a medical panel is mandatory only
where there is a medical controversy as evidenced through
conflicting medical reports. Whether there are conflicting medical
reports is a question of fact. We must uphold the Commission's
factual findings if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence based upon the record as a while. When reviewing the
Commission's application of its own rules, this Court will not
disturb the agency's interpretation or application of one of the
same page, Benson cites the ALJ's statement in her Findings of Fact that "Dr.
Gordon disagreed with Dr. Zeluff as to the cause of the petitioner's left knee
condition" as the basis of his contention that the case should have been referred to
a medical panel. Point II of his argument section, which is where he addresses his
contention that there was a conflicting medical opinion regarding causation, deals
entirely with the opinions of doctors Gordon and Zeluff concerning the cause of
his left knee injury.
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agency's rules unless its determination exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality. Thus, we will overturn the agency's
interpretation only if that interpretation is an abuse of discretion.
Brown, 947 P.2d at 677 (citations omitted).
Benson's entire argument concerning the necessity of a medical panel
arises from a paragraph in the ALJ's findings of fact in which she states that "Dr.
Gordon disagreed with Dr. Zeluff as to the cause of the petitioner's left knee
condition." (R. Vol. 1 at 69). It relies entirely on notes Dr. Gordon took
concerning an office visit Benson made in July of 2000. The disagreement
concerning the cause of Benson's left knee condition is not significant, as required
by R602-2-2, nor is it based on opinion or medical reports.
Dr. Zeluff, the Petitioner's own medical expert, performed an examination
and submitted a medical report detailing his opinions concerning Benson's injuries.
He clearly stated that he did not believe that Benson's left knee injury was related
to his industrial accident. (R. Vol. 3 at 501, 503.)
On the other hand, the document upon which Benson relies to claim a
significant difference of opinion concerning causation is a brief memo in Dr.
Gordon's records detailing Benson's office visit on July 27, 2000. The doctor's
note states that "[a]t this point, it appears that he has an irritation of the left knee
probably aggravated from the abnormal gait from his right foot injury. Would
recommend getting an MRI of the left knee to rule out a lateral meniscus tear." (R.
Vol. 2 at 157.) This document was clearly not meant as a statement of Dr.
Gordon's opinion concerning the cause of Benson's left knee injury, nor was it a
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medical report. Rather, it is a brief memo meant for Benson's file to remind Dr.
Gordon of what was discussed during Benson's visit. His statement that "[a]t this
point, it appears that he has an irritation of the left knee probably
aggravated.. .from the right foot injury" is not language that suggests an opinion
concerning causation, but rather appears to be a vague hypothesis that he intended
to test with a recommended diagnostic procedure.
Given the nature of the document and the extremely vague language that
related Dr. Gordon's "opinion," the ALJ acted both reasonably and rationally by
determining that Dr. Gordon's office note did not create a significant conflicting
opinion in the face of Dr. Zeluff s clearly stated opinion contained in his medical
report. As such, the ALJ did not abuse her discretion by ruling on the question of
causation without the assistance of a medical panel.
D. Even if the Opinions of Doctors Zeluff and Gordon Constitute
Conflicting Medical Opinions with Regard to the Cause of Benson's
Left Knee Injury, Such Conflict is Irrelevant to Benson's Claims.
In order to prove permanent total disability, the petitioner must show that
the industrial injury caused total disability. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b).
If the petitioner cannot show that the injury caused total disability, the claim for
permanent disability fails and the cause of the injury, whether medically disputed
or not, is simply irrelevant.
Benson's focus on the Commission's failure to utilize a medical panel to
determine the cause of his left knee injury is misplaced, given that Benson himself
has acknowledged that his left knee injury was not the cause of his alleged total
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disability. At the evidentiary hearing, Benson testified that he is disabled mainly
due to sleep problems caused by "nervous legs" and cognitive difficulties related
to an assortment of medications he takes, not because of his knee injury. (R. Vol.
4 at 26, 42.) Benson has not proved that his sleep problems or cognitive
difficulties are related in any way to his left knee injury.
Benson states that his sleep problems are caused by "nervous legs," a
condition that makes both of his legs "flip uncontrollably" at night. (R. Vol. 4 at
26.) He has made various vague statements suggesting that his nervous legs are
related to his left knee injury, but has not presented any medical evidence
demonstrating a connection between his twitching legs and his left knee injury.
Additionally, he has not shown how or why his left knee injury could have caused
nervous leg syndrome in both of his legs.
Similarly, Benson testified that he has been on "dozens and dozens" of
different medications. (R. Vol. 4 at 28.) However, he has not specified which
medications he believes caused his cognitive problems, nor has he submitted any
medical evidence to prove that his cognitive difficulties are a result of any of the
dozens of medications he has been on, or that any such medications were
necessitated by his left knee injury.
In the end, the cause of Benson's left knee injury is totally irrelevant
because he has not shown that the injury stopped him from performing his job
duties at Lucent. The job in question is a "white collar" desk job that would be
well suited for any person who lacked full mobility, including individuals using
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crutches or a wheelchair. Simply put, a fully functional left knee was not a
requirement for his job.
In summary, Benson has failed to prove that his left knee injury kept him
from performing his duties at Lucent, or that the conditions he believes prevented
him from performing his duties, his sleep problems and cognitive difficulties, were
related in any way to his left knee injury. As such, his left knee injury is irrelevant
to his permanent total disability claim because it did not cause a total disability.
Where the injury is irrelevant, the question of causation, whether medically
disputed or not, need not be determined by a medical panel. Accordingly,
Benson's insistence that the ALJ should have convened a medical panel is without
basis.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Lucent asks this Court to affirm the decision of
the Labor Commission. Specifically, this Court should find that the ALJ and the
Labor Commission did not abuse their discretion by relying on the medical records
exhibit as it existed at the time of the evidentiary hearing, and by not convening a
medical panel to examine the causation of Benson's left knee symptoms.
DATED this V^

day of January, 2007.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
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ADDENDUM A

DETERMANITIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413Q):
(l)(a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident
or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in
this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the
employee must prove by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease
that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of
the employee's permanent total disability.
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that
limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions
of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking
into consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and
(E) residual functional capacity.
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than
those provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act, if relevant:
(i) may be presented to the commission;
(ii) is not binding; and
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601:
(l)(a)The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical aspects of a case
described in this Subsection (l)(a) to a medical panel appointed by an
adminislrative law judge
(i) upon the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of and in the
course of employment for:
(A) disability by accident; or
(B) death by accident; and
(ii) if the employer or the employer's insurance carrier denies liability.
(b) An administrative law judge may appoint a medical panel appointed by an
administrative law judge upon the filing of a claim for compensation based
upon disability or death due to an occupational disease.
(c) A medical panel appointed under this section shall consist of one or more
physicians specializing in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in
the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of
the medical aspects of a controverted case, the division may employ a medical
director or one or more medical consultants:
(i) on a full-time or part-time basis; and
(ii) for the purpose of:
(A) evaluating the medical evidence; and
(B) advising an administrative law judge with respect to the
administrative law judge's ultimate fact-finding responsibility.
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or one or more medical
consultants, the medical director or one or more medical consultants shall be
allowed to function in the same manner and under the same procedures as
required of a medical panel.
(2)(a) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant may do the
following to the extent the medical panel, medical director, or medical
consultant determines that it is necessary or desirable:
(i) conduct a study;
(ii) take an x-ray;
(iii) perform a test; or
(iv) if authorized by an administrative law judge, conduct a post-mortem
examination.
(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall make:
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed
by the Division of Adjudication; and
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require.

(c) In an occupational disease case, in addition to the requirements of
Subsection (2)(b), a medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant
shall certify to the administrative law judge:
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work
for remuneration or profit;
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the
medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant results from the
occupational disease; and
(iii)(A) whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged, accelerated,
or in any way contributed to the disability or death; and
(B) if another cause has contributed to the disability or death, the extent
in percentage to which the other cause has contributed to the disability
or death.
(d)(i) The administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a
report submitted to the administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by
certified mail with return receipt requested to:
(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer; and
(C) the employees insurance carrier.
(ii) Within 15 days after the report described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is
deposited in the United States post office, the following may file with the
administrative law judge written objections to the report:
(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer; or
(C) the employees insurance carrier.
(iii) If no written objections are filed within the period described in
Subsection (2)(d)(ii), the report is considered admitted in evidence.
(e)(i) The administrative law judge may base the administrative law judge's
finding and decision on the report of:
(A) a medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) one or more medical consultants.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e)(i), an administrative law judge is not
bound by a report described in Subsection (2)(e)(i) if other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding.
(f)(i) If an objection to a report is filed under Subsection (2)(d), the
administrative law judge may set the case for hearing to determine the facts
and issues involved.

(ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection (2)(f), any party may
request the administrative law judge to have any of the following present at
the hearing for examination and cross-examination:
(A) the chair of the medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) the one or more medical consultants.
(iii) For good cause shown, the administrative law judge may order the
following to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination:
(A) a member of a medical panel, with or without the chair of the
medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) a medical consultant.
(g)(i) The written report of a medical panel, medical director, or one or more
medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing described in
Subsection (2)(f).
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(g)(i), a report received as an exhibit
under Subsection (2)(g)(i) may not be considered as evidence in the case
except as far as the report is sustained by the testimony admitted.
(h) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultant before July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay
out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund established in Section 34A-2-702:
(i) expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical director,
or medical consultant; and
(ii) the expenses of the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical
consultant's appearance before the administrative law judge.
(i)(i) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultant on or after July 1, 1997, the commission shall
pay out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund established in Section 34A-2-704
the expenses of:
(A) the study and report of the medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultant; and
(B) the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's
appearance before the administrative law judge.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the expenses described in
Subsection (2)(i)(i) shall be paid from the Uninsured Employers' Fund
whether or not the employment relationship during which the industrial
accident or occupational disease occurred is localized in Utah as described
in Subsection 34A-2-704(20).

Utah Administrative Code R602-2-UH):
H. Medical Records Exhibit.
1. The parties are expected to exchange medical records during the
discovery period.
2. Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records contained in his/her
possession to the respondent for the preparation of a joint medical records
exhibit at least twenty (20) working days prior to the scheduled hearing.
3. The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record exhibit containing
all relevant medical records. The medical record exhibit shall include all
relevant treatment records that tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue.
Hospital nurses' notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials
need not be included in the medical record exhibit.
4. The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged by medical
care provider in chronological order and bound.
5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent shall be delivered
to the Division and the petitioner or petitioner's counsel at least ten (10)
working days prior to the hearing. Late-filed medical records may or may not
be admitted at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation or
for good cause shown.
6. The administrative law judge may require the respondent to submit an
additional copy of the joint medical record exhibit in cases referred to a
medical panel.
7. The petitioner is responsible to obtain radiographs and diagnostic films
for review by the medical panel. The administrative law judge shall issue
subpoenas where necessary to obtain radiology films.
Utah Administrative Code R602-2-2:
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the following
guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or
more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a significant
medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
1. Conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease;
2. Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which
vary more than 5% of the whole person,

3. Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which
vary more than 90 days;
4. Conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total
disability, and/or
5. Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $10,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there is
a proffer of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarify the
medical panel report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting
medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, resubmit the new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured worker to be
examined by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to
obtain a report addressing these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to give an impairment rating,
and/or
2. A substantial injustice may occur without such further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical
consultant and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for
further medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative
Law Judge, shall be paid from the Uninsured Employers1 Fund, as directed by
Section 34A-2-601.

